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BOTHERSOME BOULEVARD'S*
By JoHN W. T. WEBB**
It is almost inevitable that automobiles on Maryland highways
should have created the unwieldy accumulation of case law now extant.
Motor vehicles themselves are powerful, potentially dangerous instru-
ments, operated by persons of differing degrees of capacity and experi-
ence, moving in close quarters at high speeds. The comparative safety
of the highway is a real tribute to the basic mechanical aptitude of the
American. Still, accidents occur, and litigation follows. The variety
of circumstances under which vehicles can collide, added to the sheer
volume of vehicles and, consequently, of collisions, has produced so
formidable a body of decisions that automobile negligence law has
become almost a specialty within itself.
With such a volume of cases, there is always a danger that the
underlying continuity of philosophy may be lost or that there may
arise an easy cataloguing of situations which obscures the basic legal
rationale. Inevitably, successive decisions refine originally simple rules
and compel re-examination of fundamental concepts. The so-called
Boulevard Rule seems to have reached this condition, and this article
is an attempt at such a re-examination. 1
This study must start with a warning. The Boulevard Rule is
limited in its application, and the first question always must be whether
there is truly a "boulevard" case. Furthermore, if there is a "boule-
vard" case, then there will always be a "favored" driver, who by
definition is on the "boulevard," and an "unfavored" driver, who by
definition is not. Thus, in considering decisions, an independent first
determination must be made of the status of each driver and the
respective ruling as to each under the Boulevard Rule, without regard
to primary negligence, contributory negligence, or even last clear chance.
Obviously, in the particular case, liability or lack of liability follows,
dependent on ordinary principles of primary negligence, absence of con-
tributory negligence, and the applicability of last clear chance. All this
may be stating the obvious, but decisions in the "boulevard" field are
riot easy for analysis. At least two drivers are always involved, fre-
quently with a third party suing both, and this seems to give rise to
some confusion in the application of precedent.
The fact that a comprehensive grasp of the Boulevard Rule is
proving difficult to those who toil in the field of automobile negligence
* This article originated in a lecture and outline on the Boulevard Rule for the
Maryland Bar Association Committee on Continuing Legal Education program in the
spring of 1965. The research progressed into a paper for the Tidewater Law Club,
and in turn into this dissertation. Credits must be acknowledged for the questions asked
at these various discussions which stimulated the synthesis and criticism that follows.
** A.B. 1941, Williams College; LL.B. 1948, Harvard Law School; Partner,
Webb, Anderson & Burnett, Salisbury, Maryland.
1. While this article attempts to consider all the material decisions dealing with
this limited area, it does not refer to or cite all the so-called boulevard cases, or the
related decisions which are cited therein. The decisions cited are those which seem
relevant to boulevard law in its present state, with a caveat to those that seem super-
ceded, if not reversed.
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law is undoubtedly due in part to its nomenclature, because the "boule-
vard" to which the Rule refers is no longer a "boulevard" as we com-
monly use the term. In addition, there is a basic contradiction between
the elementary rules of negligence law and the judicial justification of
the so-called Boulevard Rule which inevitably must lead to confusion.
Before considering the possibility of dispelling the fog, it is neces-
sary first to establish what the Boulevard Rule is and how it is
presently applied.
APPLICATION OF THE "BOULEVARD" RULE
The limited aspect of automobile negligence law to which the
"Boulevard Rule" applies has now been defined by the Maryland Court
of Appeals with considerable precision: It applies only where there is
a collision between two vehicles when two physical factors are both
present.
First - Boulevard: There must be a favored street or highway
and an unfavored intersecting highway, street or private road on which
traffic is required to stop, either by a traffic control device or by law,
and to yield right of way to traffic approaching on the favored highway
(or in the case of a "yield" sign, merely to yield right of way).
Second - Entrance: The collision must occur as a direct conse-
quence of the entrance of a vehicle onto the favored highway in dis-
regard of its obligation to yield the right of way.
The rule applies to more than four-wheeled motor vehicles.2 It
has been applied to motorcycles,' bicycles,4 a horse and wagon 5 and
a tractor-drawn farm rig.6 On the other hand, it does not apply to
a pedestrian.'
The Boulevard Rule does not apply at an intersection where there
is neither a traffic control device nor statutory requirement com-
pelling the unfavored vehicle to stop and yield right of way. These
uncontrolled intersections are controlled by the "car on the right" rule.'
Under some circumstances, the first car in such an intersection may
still have the common law right of way.9 The rule also does not apply
to a turn off a boulevard,'" even though such a turn may be a left turn
across oncoming traffic at an intersection, where the turning driver
has a statutory duty to yield right of way under section 232 of the
Motor Vehicle Law."
2. MD. COnE ANN. art. 66V2, § 184 (1957).
3. Simco Sales Service v. Schweigman, 237 Md. 180, 205 A.2d 245 (1964).
4. Kane v. Williams, 229 Md. 59, 181 A.2d 651 (1962).
5. Fowler v. De Fontes, 211 Md. 568, 128 A.2d 395 (1957).
6. Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 122 A.2d 570 (1956), noted in 17 MD.
L. Riv. 68 (1959).
7. Folck v. Anthony, 228 Md. 73, 178 A.2d 413 (1962).
8. MD. COne ANN. art. 66Y2, § 231 (1957).
9. Rabinovitz v. Kilner, 206 Md. 455, 112 A.2d 483 (195q- See ql.o Ghiradello
v. Malina, 238 Md. 498, 209 A.2d 564 (1964).
10. Bricker v. Graceffo, 236 Md. 558, 204 A.2d 512 (1964).
11. Tates v. Toney, 231 Md. 9, 188 A.2d 283 (1963).
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DEFINITION OF "BOULEVARD"
Against this background, some situations where there is a "boule-
vard" within the meaning of the Rule are readily recognized. The
Motor Vehicle Law imposes on unfavored drivers the duty to stop at
the entrance to a "through highway" and to yield right of way to
vehicles approaching on the through highway.' By definition a
"through highway" is one where vehicles on intersecting highways
are required to stop and yield right of way and where stop signs are
erected.' 3 The same dual duty of stopping and yielding may also be
imposed by a "stop" sign on an intersecting highway.'4 Local authori-
ties, as well as the State Roads Commission, have the authority to
designate "through highways" and to erect stop signs.' The more
recently evolved "yield" sign has also created a "boulevard" situation,
although there is no absolute duty to stop.'"
The same duty to stop and yield right of way is imposed by statute
on the driver entering a paved highway from an unpaved road, or
from a private road or driveway.'7 Regardless of the nature of the
favored highway under such circumstances, it is considered a "boule-
vard" under the Boulevard Rule.'" Over the vigorous protest of Chief
Judge Brune, the court has also found a red traffic light to create a
"boulevard" for the driver withthe green light.'9 The same result will
also apply at the intersection where there is a flashing yellow light for
traffic on the favored highway and a flashing red light for traffic on
the unfavored highway, although both decisions involving this section
have also involved a "stol" sign on the unfavored highway, which the
court considered insignificant.2 0
12. Mn. CoDE ANN. art. 66%, §§ 233(a), 242(c) (1957).
13. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66Y, § 2(60) (Supp. 1965).
14. MD. COD ANN. art. 66V2, § 233(b) (1957).
15. MD. CODS ANN. art. 662, §§ 191, 242(a) (1957), § 185(6) (Supp. 1965).
There is an early case which holds that a stop sign erected under municipal ordinance,
as opposed to state law, does not create a boulevard. McClenny v. Przyborowski, 182
Md. 95, 32 A.2d 365 (1943). While not specifically overruled, this distinction is
certainly no longer meaningful in determining the duty of an unfavored driver, since
local authorities are empowered now to erect traffic control devices. Such devices can
create a boulevard situation.
16. MD. CODS ANN. art. 66%, §§ 2(60), 233 (Supp. 1965). Merritt v. Darden,
227 Md. 589, 176 A.2d 205 (1962).
17. Mn. Cong ANN. art. 66Y2, § 234 (1957). There still seems to be an open
question whether a driver entering a street from a public alley or other equivalent and
obviously secondary way is required to stop and to yield right of way, in the absence
of a stop sign. Section 208 of the Motor Vehicle Law requires such a stop, prior to
driving onto the sidewalk from an alley, but the intent of this section, which also
applies to private driveways and buildings, is to protect sidewalk pedestrians. Section
199, which is the comparable section with respect to roads and streets, requires a stop,
whether a sign is present or not, only from unpaved public highways and private
roads and driveways. If an alley is public and paved, therefore, there would appear
to be no application of the Boulevard Rule to an entrance onto a street from such an
alley in the absence of a stop sign.
18. Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 122 A.2d 570 (1956).
19. Eastern Contractors v. State, 225 Md. 112, 169 A.2d 430 (1961), noted in23 MD. L. REv. 172 (1963). To the author of the present article, the interest of traffic
flow justifies extension of the Boulevard Rule to the "green light" situation.
20. Mn. COD4 ANN. art. 66V, § 196 (1957). Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169
A.2d 661 (1961) ; State v. Marvil Package, 202 Md. 592, 98 A.2d 94 (1953). Unre-
solved up to this point is the situation where there is a stop sign at the entrance to a
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The long line of cases in which the Boulevard Rule has been
applied make it clear that a "boulevard" may exist on any type of
street or highway, major or minor, so long as the unfavored driver is
required to stop and yield right of way before entering. In the ver-
nacular, a "stop street" intersects with a "boulevard." The inherent
contradiction in this terminology is that "boulevard" describes the road
occupied by the favored driver; therefore, the existence of the "boule-
vard" would seem to depend on the character of the favored road as it
appears to the favored driver. Actually, however, the existence of the
"boulevard" is exclusively established by the control imposed on the
unfavored driver and is really often known only to the unfavored driver.
Two decisions illustrate this point. Houlihan v. McCall2" involved
an intersection where roads A and B crossed; there was a stop sign
for traffic on Road A on one side of the intersection, but not on the
other side. No stop sign stood on either side of the intersection on
Road B. Road B was held not to be a "boulevard" as to the driver
who approached on Road A from the side where there was no stop
sign. In Nardone v. Underwood,22 a driver on dual U.S. Route No. 30,
in southern Maryland, was not on a "boulevard" where there was no
stop sign on an intersecting road.
These cases would appear to be in direct conflict with Hickory
Transfer v. Nezbed.23 In this case, a truck was traveling on Orleans
Street in Baltimore, where lights were timed for steady traffic flow.
One light was defective and seemed out of order to the trucker. It was,
in fact, green for a car on the intersecting street, and truck and car
collided. The court nonetheless held the truck to be on a boulevard
and therefore favored. While there is a persuasive argument in sup-
port of this conclusion, based on a legislative policy of expediting
arterial traffic, the Hickory Transfer decision must be regarded as
overruled by Nardone.2 4
highway under construction which has not yet been opened to public use. If a car
fails to stop at the sign, and yield right of way to a vehicle (a contractor's truck, for
example) on the unopened road, does the Boulevard Rule apply? The boulevard
statutes and decisions test the highway status by the presence of a stop sign, and not
the condition of the other road. The unopened condition of the favored road therefore
would seem to make no difference.
21. 197 Md. 130, 78 A.2d 661 (1951).
22. 219 Md. 326, 149 A.2d 13 (1959).
23. 202 Md. 253, 96 A.2d 241 (1953).
24. In this case, the court seemed, without discussion, to assume that there could
be a through highway without a stop sign or traffic control device being erected.
Section 233 (a) of the Motor Vehicle Law requires a stop at an entrance to a through
street and a yielding of right of way to traffic on that street. Section 233(b) requires
the same conduct at a stop sign. Section 242(a) permits the designation of through
streets and imposes an obligation on the State Roads Commission (or local authori-
ties) for erecting appropriate signs. Section 242(c) essentially duplicates Section
233(b). The court has never considered this statutory duplication meaningful, except
to the extent that such a conclusion can be inferred from this decision.
Such a distinction as the court seemed to draw in the cited case does not strain
the statute unduly, however, or the definition of through highway (section 2(60)), and
is reasonable since it gives validity to the often-expressed legislative policy of expedit-
ing traffic by not requiring a driver on a genuinely through highway to slow at every
intersection. It is not, however, the present law, and a stop sign, not apparent to the
favored driver, creates a boulevard on which the favored driver may even ignore a
"Slow - Dangerous Intersection" sign. Belle Isle Cab v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174, 49 A.2d
537 (1946).
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There is yet another dimension to be considered in the determina-
tion of whether a stop sign requires an apparently unfavored driver to
stop and yield right of way. Section 189 of article 662 of the Mary-
land Code (the Motor Vehicle Law) requires the State Roads Com-
mission to adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of
traffic control devices, and, under section 191, such devices must
conform to the uniform system when placed by local authorities. The
law requires stop signs to "be located as near as practical to the prop-
erty line of the highway.''25 The Manual of Traffic Control Devices
of the State Roads Commission requires such signs to be erected not
closer than six feet nor more than fifty feet from the intersection. In
Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Trammell,16 the court had before it a situation
of two converging streets, which were crossed at roughly right angles
by another street at a point shortly before they merged. The triangle
formed, with the merging streets as the two sides and the intersecting
street as the base, was paved. There were stop signs for traffic on the
intersecting street at each corner where it crossed the merging streets;
however, there was no place to erect a stop sign for traffic in one
direction on the intersecting street before it crossed the second of the
merging streets, and no sign was posted. The court held that the
driver on the intersecting street in this one direction had no duty to
stop at the second merging street, because the one posted stop sign was
more than the distance from this intersection prescribed by the Manual
and hence did not control. Thus, the favored street was a "boulevard"
from one side but not from the other.
The court later reached a similar result in a somewhat comparable
case.17 Here, there was a busy "Y"-type intersection between a major
road and a secondary street. The curb lines of both streets had been
extended across a paved area with paint to the point of actual meeting.
Across the base of the painted triangle so formed was a painted
vehicular way for turning vehicles. There was only one stop sign for
vehicles on the secondary street, located some 100 feet from the point
where the streets merged, but close to the turning passageway. The
court held that by reason of the distance requirements of the Manual,
the stop sign required a stop before crossing the turning passageway.
Inferentially at least, this last decision holds that the stop sign did not
control the entrance onto the principal thoroughfare. There was no
obligation to yield right of way where the real hazard existed, then,
and the sign controlled only a minor incident to the dangerous traffic.
The test, therefore, of when a "boulevard" exists is entirely
dependent on whether either driver on intersecting roads (public or
private) is required to stop and yield right of way to the other. This
may not be easy to resolve (especially from the seat of the driver who
has the problem), but if one has such a requirement, then the driver
on whom such obligation is imposed is entering a "boulevard." Absent
such requirement, there is no "boulevard." If there is no "boulevard,"
then there can be no application of the Boulevard Rule.
25. MD. CODP ANN. art. 66Y2, § 242(b) (1957).
26. 227 Md. 438, 177 A.2d 404 (1962).
27. Savage v. Mills, 237 Md. 204, 205 A.2d 239 (1964).
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DEFINITION OF ENTERING
Once it is established that a "boulevard" is involved, there is a
further condition which must be met before the Boulevard Rule can
apply: the accident must occur as the unfavored driver is entering upon
the "boulevard." The Motor Vehicle Law requires the unfavored
driver to yield right of way, and he yields right of way by not entering
the highway. Once he has safely entered, other rules apply.
Most cases arise from collisions that take place within the actual
intersection of favored and unfavored streets. It is a mistake, how-
ever, to limit entering under the Boulevard Rule to an intersection.
An intersection itself is defined in the Motor Vehicle Law as the area
within the lateral boundary lines of intersectiong roads, if approximately
at right angles, or otherwise the area where vehicles traveling on the
intersecting roads may come in conflict.2" Thus, the geographical
bounds of such an intersection can be precisely drawn in every case.
Where there is a dual highway with a median strip and an intersecting
road, there is only one intersection and not two.2"
It is apparent, however, that an unfavored car entering a favored
highway has not really entered until the unfavored car has reached
its proper lane of traffic and has attained the speed of the flow of traffic.
Up to this point, the unfavored car can be considered as interfering with
the right of way of the favored car. Obviously, therefore, "entering"
within the Boulevard Rule cannot be confined to the bounds of
an intersection.
The Court of Appeals has made this point clear in a series of
cases, although there was at first some misconception of their holdings.
Both the earliest cases3" involved head-on collisions; in each, there
was evidence that the unfavored car's entering onto the boulevard had
precipitated an emergency reaction by the favored driver which resulted
in the collision. Both also had evidence that the unfavored driver
had safely gotten into his lane and that the accident would not have
occurred except for negligence of the favored driver. The court held
the jury must determine which version was correct; if the jury found
that failure to yield right of way was a cause, then the unfavored
driver was negligent. The next case in historic sequence involved a
rear end collision, but there it was unclear whether the court failed
completely to give credence to evidence that the unfavored driver
cleared the intersection, or concluded instead that it did not matter
where the impact occurred if the favored car was in fact blocked."
The issue was finally resolved with a flat statement that a collision
outside the intersection does not bar the applicability of the Boulevard
Rule, if in fact the collision was a result of a violation of the unfavored
driver's duty to yield right of way.32 Thus, the test for application of
the Boulevard Rule is whether the accident has taken place while the
28. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66%, § 2(20) (1957).
29. Packer v. Hampden Transfer, 206 Md. 407, 111 A.2d 849 (1955).
30. Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235, 93 A.2d 541 (1953) and Shaneybrook v. Blizzard,
209 Md. 304, 121 A.2d 218 (1956).
31. Schwartz v. Price, 215 Md. 43, 136 A.2d 749 (1957).
32. McDonald v. Wolfe, 226 Md. 198, 172 A.2d 481 (1961).
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unfavored driver is going through all the phases of entering the
favored highway.
It now seems established that an unfavored car still within the
intersection is conclusively presumed to be entering the highway
Once the unfavored car has cleared the intersection itself, there will
be a jury issue whether the accident occurred while it was entering
the boulevard, unless, on the one hand, the evidence is conclusive that
the accident did occur while entering, or, on the other hand, the
evidence is conclusive that the unfavored car had successfully entered
so that the unfavored driver had ceased to be a "perpetual pariah. '3 3
POSITION OF THE UNFAVORED DRIVER
If the facts require application of the Boulevard Rule, the Motor
Vehicle Law imposes on the unfavored driver an absolute duty to
stop and an absolute duty to yield right of way. In fact, as discussed
above, the existence of the dual duties is necessary for the Boulevard
Rule to be applicable at all. If the unfavored driver has stopped, he has
an opportunity to observe and to avoid any hazards that may exist
on the road he proposes to enter. Not only the Motor Vehicle Law,
but also his duty to avoid deliberately injuring others, compels him not
to enter the favored highway if such entrance will expose others to
harm. It follows under the reasoning of the cases that if his entry
causes injury, it is a direct cause of such injury and is a breach of his
duty to others.
This line of reasoning runs through every boulevard case where
the legal position of the unfavored driver is considered. The decisions
leave no question that if the Boulevard Rule is applicable, the un-
favored driver is negligent, regardless of his excuse. Indeed, except
in cases where there is a question of fact whether the accident took
place during entry onto the boulevard, the unfavored driver in a
boulevard situation is negligent as a matter of law.
Thus, an unfavored driver was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law when he was struck by a racing car while crossing a
boulevard, although there was positive evidence that the unfavored
driver would have had adequate time to cross if the racing car had been
approaching at a lawful speed.34 A driver of a farm rig was negligent
as a matter of law in crossing a boulevard - here, a secondary high-
way - from a farm lane, although the car which struck him was hidden
from his view by the crest of a hill several hundred feet away. 35 A
driver of an unfavored car was negligent as a matter of law in edging
out into a blind intersection, even though there was no contact with
the favored car, which was in a distant lane and which went out of con-
trol through the favored driver's efforts to avoid an expected collision.3 6
In other decisions, an unfavored driver was negligent as a matter
of law in failing to stop as he moved to what he believed to be the
33. Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 205 A.2d 260 (1964).
34. State v. Gosnell, 197 Md. 381, 79 A.2d 530 (1951).
35. Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 122 A.2d 570 (1956).
36. Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230, 179 A.2d 371 (1962).
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proper stop line, when he collided with a favored car turning closely
around a blind corner off the boulevard. 37 In another case, a trucker
crossing a boulevard was negligent although the boulevard was, in
his testimony, clear when he entered; he was struck in the rear by a
car which admittedly had entered from a cross-street well within this
trucker's range of vision, and undoubtedly after the trucker had started
to cross.38
The sum of the decisions is that the unfavored driver enters the
boulevard at his peril. If there is a collision, there may still be a jury
question on whether his entrance was the cause, even if he has reached
his proper lane and is in the flow of traffic.
Any thoughtful analysis of the Boulevard Rule must lead to the
question whether the courts have not taken the motor vehicle statutes
too far into the law of negligence. The Motor Vehicle Law, after all,
is essentially a criminal code which is enforced by the state with criminal
penalties. It applies to civil law only to the extent that it establishes a
pattern of proper conduct. The law of negligence, on the other hand, is
the civil law under which an individual finds redress for harm done to
him by another. While every individual is entitled to assume that
others will obey the law, it does not necessarily follow that violation
of criminal law and civil liability must walk step-by-step indefinitely.
There can be no basis for making civil law more stringent than its
criminal counterpart, which is the present result in boulevard cases.
Generally, it is elementary in the law of torts that for every right,
there is a corresponding, duty. In automobile negligence law, the duty
is upon every driver to observe and obey the motor vehicle law, and
every other driver has the corresponding right to such observance and
obedience. But also, in the law of torts, a person with a right is not
ordinarily completely excused from some reciprocal duty to another,
and the other is entitled to have this reciprocal duty respected as well.
Automobile negligence cases, however, rarely are considered in
the light of reciprocal rights and duties, although the consideration is
implicit in most. In the vast majority of the boulevard cases where
the negligence of the unfavored driver is an issue, there can be no valid
complaint against the equation: violation of the right of way law equals
civil liability. The basic duty of every driver is to cause no harm to
others by his conduct; obedience to the Motor Vehicle Law gives him
the means of fulfilling that duty. With all these advantages, an acci-
dent occurring when the unfavored driver leaves his place of safety to
enter the boulevard can only be a breach of his duty, directly caused
by his positive action, and therefore an unassailable basis for civil
liability as a matter of law.
There are, of course, variants on this situation. The example
assumes that the unfavored driver can see oncoming traffic. There may
be an entrance where his vision is blocked. He may move out into the
favored highway under such circumstances, in an honest and careful
attempt to see whether his way is clear, and in so doing cause a
collision with a favored vehicle. Even though the unfavored driver can
37. Savage v. Mills, 237 Md. 204, 205 A.2d 239 (1964).
38. Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 204 A.2d 526 (1964).
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see, his range of vision may be too limited for him to get into the flow
of traffic successfully; or, having begun his entrance, he may then see
a favored vehicle which could avoid a collision with him if it were
operated with reasonable care.
Certainly, there is persuasive equity in permitting the issue of the
negligence of the unfavored driver to be submitted to the jury under
such circumstances, rather than resolving it as a matter of law. The
present state of the Boulevard Rule may reflect an unconscious and
unspoken distrust by the court for the ability of a jury to weigh facts
and apply legal principles objectively in a situation that cries for
sympathy. On the other hand, the Motor Vehicle Law demonstrates
a clear public policy in favor of the unimpeded flow of traffic, which it
furthers by imposing barriers on unfavored vehicles which otherwise
could impede the flow. This policy can justify stern treatment of even
the cautious driver and supports the seemingly harsh decisions on the
blind driver, if he causes an accident by failing, however innocently,
to obey the law. 9
There are essentially the same elements present in the traffic light
cases, which are also now governed by the Boulevard Rule.4" The
statute requires vehicles facing a red light to stop; such vehicles, before
starting after the light changes, must yield right of way to vehicles
already lawfully in the intersection. A vehicle facing the green light
must stop when it turns to amber, but if it cannot stop safely, then it
may be driven cautiously through the intersection." As with the stop
sign situation, the unfavored vehicle facing a red light that shifts to
green is in a position where its driver can see if the way is clear before
he starts, and by simple inaction he can avoid all danger to others until
the danger clears. The legislative policy mentioned above, and a further
implicit policy of preventing accidents, justify harsh treatment of the
unfavored driver who deviates from these duties.42
Up to this point, there has been another basic assumption, i.e.,
that the favored driver was proceeding lawfully. Even if this is not
true, however, there still is no justification for the accident-inducing con-
duct of an unfavored driver who does not have his vision blocked. He
should never have left his place of safety in the face of visible unlawful
operations by the favored driver. As the Maryland high court has
repeatedly said, beginning with Sun Cab v. Faulkner,43 the accident
would never have occurred if the unfavored vehicle had yielded
right of way.
For this reason, there can be no quarrel with two other seemingly
harsh cases. In one, an unfavored driver was found contributorily
39. Savage v. Mills, 237 Md. 204, 205 A.2d 239 (1964) ; Dunnill v. Bloomberg,
228 Md. 230, 179 A.2d 371 (1962) and Shriner v. Mullhausen, 210 Md. 104, 122 A.2d
570 (1956).
40. Eastern Contractors v. State, 225 Md. 112, 169 A.2d 430 (1961).
41. MD. COD ANN. art. 66Y, § 193(b) (1) (1957).
42. Obviously, the color of the light and the position of vehicles at the time of
light changes may create jury issues. The boulevard law is the law to apply once thejury has resolved these facts. Welsh v. Porter, 231 Md. 483, 190 A.2d 781 (1963). But
the court has not hesitated to find an unfavored driver negligent as a matter of law.
Baltimore Transit v. Presberry, 233 Md. 303, 196 A.2d 717 (1964).
43. 163 Md. 477, 163 Atl. 194 (1932).
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negligent as a matter of law, although he was struck by a favored
racing car.44 The accident occurred at night, but the court noted
the unfavored driver's ability to see oncoming lights two-tenths of a
mile away. He was held to the responsibility of judging oncoming
speed and stopping when he saw a collision was otherwise inevitable.
This same duty of stopping in mid-passage was reflected in a later con-
tributory negligence ruling4 5 where a horse and cart projected them-
selves across a wide road and into the path of a favored car. In each
of these cases, the court pointed to the opportunity of the unfavored
driver, even after he had started his entrance, to avoid the collision,
and his unseeing progress into peril.
There can, however, be circumstances where the vision of the
unfavored driver is obscured and the favored car is unlawfully operated.
For example, the unfavored car may be intending to turn right into a
two-way favored street; it collides head-on with a car on the wrong
side. Certainly the unfavored driver in such a case as this has a right
to assume lawful operation of the favored car until he sees otherwise.
It can be argued that this is an open question, but a recent case estab-
lished a clear inference that the unfavored driver will be held negligent
as a matter of law.
In the 1964 case of Brown v. Ellis,46 a tractor-trailer entered an
intersection when the favored street was clear for as far as'could be
seen. The distances involved strongly suggest that the truck could have
crossed safely before any favored car, driven at a lawful speed, would
have reached the intersection. The rear of the rig was nevertheless
struck by a favored car that apparently had entered the street after
the truck began to cross. Judgment on verdict for the defendant trucker
was reversed. The trucker was held primarily negligent as a matter of
law, but the case was remanded on the issue of contributory negligence
of the favored plaintiff driver in not keeping a proper look-out. While
the court commented in that case on the heavy duty of care borne by
the driver of so ponderous and cumbersome a vehicle, the only con-
clusion that can be drawn is that the unfavored driver enters the
boulevard absolutely at his peril. It is not necessary for there to be
impact between the favored and unfavored vehicles. 4 7 It does not
matter whether the impact takes place within the intersection.48 If an
accident ensues, as a matter of law it is at least in part due to the un-
favored driver's negligence.
Brown v. Ellis makes it clear that a plaintiff favored driver may
be barred from recovery by contributory negligence. Theoretically,
44. State v. Gosnell, 197 Md. 381, 79 A.2d 530 (1951).
45. Fowler v. De Fontes, 211 Md. 568, 128 A.2d 395 (1957).
46. 236 Md. 487, 204 A.2d 526 (1964).
47. Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230, 179 A.2d 371 (1962).
48. Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218, 46 A.2d 349 (1946) and Savage v. Mills,
237 Md. 204, 205 A.2d 239 (1964). Still undecided is the problem of the position of
the unfavored driver who is involved in an accident with a car turning off the boule-
vard before the unfavored car has reached the intersection. The point was raised in
Savage v. Mills, but not considered by reason of the court's determination of what
constituted an intersection in that case. If the favored driver cuts the corner, how-
ever, and ignores the statutory requirement of leaving the intersection to the right of
the center line of roadway being entered, then certainly the boulevard rule is not
applicable. Francies v. Debaugh, 194 Md. 448, 71 A.2d 455 (1950).
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the doctrine of last clear chance could also provide an escape from
absolute responsibility for the unfavored driver. This classic doctrine
requires primary negligence of a defendant, contributory negligence
of a plaintiff, and then last clear chance of the defendant which excuses
the plaintiff from the consequence of his contributory negligence. In
boulevard cases, however, it appears that no requirement of establish-
ing primary negligence should be postulated; there need be only the
opportunity for the favored driver to avoid an accident after he knew,
or should have known, that an accident would otherwise occur.4" To
establish such last clear chance after contributory negligence, there
must be affirmative evidence of both knowledge and ability to avoid;
such evidence is necessary to establish the required sequence of events."°
At the same time, ever since Greenfeld v. Hook5 the court has said
that it will not be concerned in boulevard cases with "nice calculations
of speed, time and distance.""2 It is significant that this was the last
case of classic last clear chance. The court denies itself and, therefore,
the unfavored driver the very evidence which might permit application
of last clear chance to a boulevard case.
Actually, last clear chance does not usually enter boulevard cases
because of the almost universal application of a concept of continuing
negligence on the part of the unfavored driver. Such continuing negli-
gence is concurrent with the last clear chance of the favored driver
and contributory negligence as a matter of law. Last clear chance does
not become an issue, as it requires a set sequence of events of which
the act of contributory negligence is separate and not overlapping.
For example, when the unfavored driver is able to avoid the accident
by stopping after he has begun his entrance, and in the exercise of
reasonable care should see the hazard, then his continuing progress
into the path of danger constitutes an act of continuing negligence.
The court, however, makes no distinction between the situation
where the unfavored driver is committed to a place of peril and con-
tinues to move in that position, and where he has an opportunity to
stop before reaching the place of peril. Even where there is no evidence
that the unfavored driver had an opportunity to avoid the accident after
seeing the oncoming favored car for the first time, the court seems to
apply the concept of continuing negligence.53 To the extent that an un-
favored driver can escape being held negligent, it would seem that he
must have been stranded in the right of way by some circumstances
beyond his control, such as mechanical failure. Even here there is a
question whether this would do more than permit him to recover from
the favored driver under the doctrine of last clear chance, which pre-
sumes that he remains contributorily negligent.
It is an inevitable conclusion from the above that the Maryland
Boulevard Rule now seems to hold clearly that the unfavored driver is
49. Cf. Meldrum v. Kellam Distributing, 211 Md. 504, 128 A.2d 400 (1957),
which is not a boulevard case.
50. Creighton v. Ruark, 230 Md. 145, 186 A.2d 208 (1962), also not a boule-
vard case.
51. 177 Md. 116, 8 A.2d 888 (1939).
52. See, e.g., Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1, 81 A.2d 47 (1951).
53. Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 204 A.2d 526 (1964).
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indeed a "perpetual pariah," who enters a favored highway at his peril
and is negligent as a matter of law in every case. With all due respect
to the court, this result has relegated the unfavored driver a status too
low in any modern system of justice. He is held to a standard of
conduct which may be impossible to meet.
It should be enough to place on the unfavored driver a presump-
tion of fault. The unfavored driver should be permitted to have a jury
pass upon his negligence if he can show: first, that he had no oppor-
tunity to see the favored car until the unfavored vehicle was irrevocably
committed to a position of peril; second, that the favored car was
operated unlawfully or carelessly; and, third, that the unfavored car
could have gotten into the flow of traffic safely except for the improper
operation of the favored car.54 There is a parallel in res ipsa loquitur
and comparable tort theories. The unfavored driver should be able to
rebut the presumption of negligence, as is allowed under res ipsa, by
showing affirmatively precise proofs of speed, time and distance, rather
than general opinions.
All of this would not impose an undue burden on the court and,
indeed, would give both jury and court the information which they
need to determine the basic question, i.e., whether the unfavored driver
violated a duty to others which was within his capacity to perform.
Also, it would remove the civil law from the wholly illogical position
whereby absolute liability is imposed in negligence cases without regard
to a standard of care.
POSITION OF THE FAVORED DRIVER
The situation of the favored driver under the Boulevard Rule is by
no means so clearly defined. It would seem to follow that if the un-
favored driver has an absolute duty to yield right of way, then the
favored driver has an absolute right to the right of way. But the
Maryland Court of Appeals has never gone this far.
In the 1939 case of Greenfeld v. Hook,5" Judge Offutt found facts
which raised a jury question on the liability of the favored driver
under the doctrine of last clear chance. Then, in a long series of
decisions, the court found the favored driver free of actionable negli-
gence on the ground that the immediate and sole cause of the accident
sued on was unlawful interference by the unfavored vehicle with the
favored car's passage.56 From the start, however, the court also made
54. In Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 120 (D. Md. 1962), the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland adopted this identical line
of reasoning in a boulevard case arising from a Maryland accident. The court said
that an unfavored driver cannot be held to the duty of yielding right of way to
vehicles whose approach he cannot discover, and it ruled that the negligence of an un-
favored driver under such circumstances shall be determined by the jury. The Court
of Appeals, in Brown v. Ellis, supra note 53, clearly stated its unwillingness to accept
this concept as Maryland law.
55. 177 Md. 116, 8 A.2d 888 (1939).
56. See, e.g., Sun Cab Co. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, 121 A.2d 188 (1956) ; State
v. Marvil Package, 202 Md. 592, 98 A.2d 94 (1953) ; Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1,
81 A.2d 47 (1951) ; Sonnenberg v. Monumental Motor Tours, 198 Md. 227, 81 A.2d
617 (1951) ; Baltimore Transit v. O'Donovan, 197 Md. 274, 78 A.2d 647 (1951);
Belle Isle Cab Co. v. Pruitt, 187 Md. 174, 49 A.2d 537 (1946) ; Shedlock v. Marshall,
186 Md. 218, 46 A.2d 349 (1946).
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it clear that a favored driver might not proceed with blind indifference
to the safety of others on the highway. Even in decisions that found
the favored driver free of negligence as a matter of law, the court
carefully reserved such a limitation on his absolution from liability.
Traditionally, this limitation has been phrased in terms of last clear
chance, although it has also been explained as the duty to avoid injuring
another who is in a position of peril.
For a number of years after the Greenfeld case, there was only
one decision, Sun Cab v. Hall,57 where the negligence of the favored
driver was considered to be a jury question. In this guest passenger
case, there was direct testimony of inattention on the part of the favored
driver, plus an apparent opportunity to avoid the accident if he had
been looking. In distinguishing this case in a later decision,58 the
court pointed to the necessity of the combination being present to estab-
lish the necessary causal relationship between inattention and accident.
It was nearly ten years more before another case arose in which
the court found the combination of inattention and ability to avoid
which made the favored driver's negligence a jury issue. 59 Again, there
was affirmative evidence of inattention and some slender evidence of
the ability to avoid. This decision was followed immediately by Green
v. Zile.60 There, the court affirmed a judgment denying recovery to
the favored driver based on a permissible inference of inattention from
his failure to see a large tractor-trailer crossing in front of him until
he was almost upon it. The tractor-trailer had to have been there for
a considerable time to get as far into the intersection as it had gotten;
also, there was no obstruction to his vision for several blocks. This
was the first case involving deductive, as opposed to affirmative,
evidence of inattention. The negligence of the favored driver, i.e.,
whether he could have avoided the accident if attentive, was held to be
a jury issue. Again, in the 1964 case of Brown v. Ellis,6 the court
held that the contributory negligence of the favored driver was for the
jury. However, the court characterized the situation and holding as
"rare" and reiterated its rule that boulevard cases "are not to be held
to depend on nice calculations of speed, time or distance."
These cases certainly render questionable the weight to be given
today to Brooks v. Childress,2 which held the favored driver free of
negligence proximately causing the accident. Decided by the same
57. 199 Md. 461, 86 A.2d 914 (1952).
58. White v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Md. 286, 140 A.2d 285 (1957). That case
affirmed the fact that a common carrier has no greater duty of care as a favored
vehicle in a boulevard case than an ordinary vehicle.
59. Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961).
60. 225 Md. 339, 170 A.2d 753 (1961). In a case decided almost concurrently, the
court pointed out the requirement of showing both inattention of the favored driver
and his ability to avoid the accident. In that case, it held that the burden of proof was
not met. Zeamer v. Reeves, 225 Md. 526, 171 A.2d 488 (1961).
61. 236 Md. 487, 204 A.2d 526 (1964). To this extent, Brown v. Ellis concurs
in the result reached by the District Court in Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 206 F.
Supp. 120 (D. Md. 1962), concerning the negligence of the favored driver.
62. 198 Md. 1, 81 A.2d 47 (1951).
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court at the same time as Sun Cab v. Hall,6 3 it is difficult to explain,
unless the affirmative evidence of inattention in the latter is the distinc-
tion. In Brooks, there was evidence that the truck involved was 1000
feet away when the unfavored car pulled out into its right of way.
Judge Markell, dissenting, pointed out that this evidence would rea-
sonably lead to an inference that the favored trucker was not paying
attention, and that an attentive driver could have avoided the accident.
This approach of Judge Markell is identical to the position of the court
in later cases, such as Brown v. Ellis. Although the court has not so
ruled, the Childress case therefore must be regarded as overruled to
the extent that on its facts it holds a favored driver free of negligence
as a matter of law. Brooks, however, is still authority for the proposi-
tion that excessive or unlawful speed on the part of the favored driver
is not negligence.64
Further, no case has yet appeared where the court considered
operation on the wrong side of the road to be a proximate cause of an
accident. In the cases where the point has been presented, the court
felt that the accident would have occurred regardless of improper road
position.' 5 Except for the question of speed, therefore, negligence in
the form of unlawful operation by the favored driver seems still an
unresolved question. His absolute freedom from actionable negligence
should not be carried further.
The real false scent in the Boulevard Rule, at root, is the concept
that it extends some special privilege to the favored driver. Since the
legislature seeks to expedite the flow of traffic, as the argument goes,
the favored driver is entitled to proceed at every intersection as if his
way is clear. Judge Offutt's justification of this in Greenfeld is as
superficially persuasive today as when it was uttered; but there is a
fundamental contradiction in this reasoning.
There is certainly a definite public policy in favor of keeping traffic
moving. The legislature has encouraged this by inhibiting unfavored
drivers, so that they may not impede favored traffic except in violation
of law; however, the statutes give no concomitant privilege to the
favored driver. The favored driver may know, when he approaches a
farm lane or a green light, that he is entitled to proceed without inter-
ference. But at highway intersections, where traffic flow and the
opportunity for collision are greatest, the awareness of a traffic control
63. 199 Md. 461, 86 A.2d 914 (1952).
64. See also Zeamer v. Reeves, 225 Md. 526, 171 A.2d 488 (1961) and Davis v.
Taylor, 217 Md. 84, 141 A.2d 706 (1958). It has frequently been held that negligence
cannot be proven from what happened after a collision. It must be noted, however,
that evidence of speed derived from post-accident data was considered material in one
chain-reaction boulevard case. The case involved a violation of the boulevard law,
a collision, and an attempt to avoid the collision by a second favored driver. While
reciting the rule that the original violation of right of way was the proximate cause
of the ultimate collision by the second favored driver, the court seemed far more
concerned with evidence of his negligence than if he had been the favored driver
whose right of way was actually invaded. Logically, whether the driver is the first
or second favored driver in an accordion accident would seem a distinction without
a difference. See Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137, 106 A.2d 98 (1954).
65. Sun Cab v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354, 121 A.2d 188 (1956) and Zeamer v. Reeves,
supra note 64. It must be remembered that the racing favored driver case, State v.
Gosnell, 197 Md. 381, 79 A.2d 530 (1951), did not decide that the favored driver was
free of negligence, but only that the unfavored driver was contributorily negligent in
failing to yield right of way.
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device requiring an unfavored driver to yield right of way is almost
always solely within the compass of the unfavored driver.
There is no logic in a rule which imposes different standards of
care upon a driver dependent upon facts which he does not ordinarily
possess. Moreover, the privilege of the favored driver under the
Boulevard Rule not only involves an unknown element, but it is also
itself variable. People put up traffic control devices, and people can
take them down. It is not beyond possibility that a stop sign could be
knocked down or taken away, and an accident occur involving some-
one who knew of the sign and did not know that the sign was gone.
On present law, the absence of the sign would deny him the right to
assume that the right of way would be yielded; thus, he would be
held to a different standard of care than if the sign were there.
There is, therefore, no justification for further extension of the
privilege of the favored driver into situations where he has originally
been driving unlawfully or carelessly. Ordinarily, in most boulevard
cases it is not material what the favored driver was doing. The accident
would never have happened if the unfavored vehicle had yielded right
of way, and the conduct of the unfavored driver is the sole proximate
cause of the accident. But if it can be shown that the favored driver
could have avoided the accident if he had been operating lawfully
and with due care, then the negligence of the favored driver should be
an issue for the jury. On the few recent decisions involving the negli-
gence of the favored driver cited above, it can be argued that this is
the present trend.
CONCLUSION
No one will debate the proposition that there is a public interest
in expediting the flow of traffic, and there is no reason that this interest
should not be reflected in automobile negligence law. At the same time,
there should be an equal interest in careful operation of motor vehicles,
and equal reflection of this interest in the law. Any rule of conduct
must be applied by the man behind the wheel under the stress of in-
stant decision; rules, therefore, should be simple. Common justice
should balance standard of care with opportunity for judgment.
Directing this philosophy to the narrow field of boulevard law,
these ends are largely achieved in so far as the unfavored driver is
concerned. When the unfavored driver reaches a stop sign or a com-
parable situation, he should have no difficulty in ascertaining his proper
course. His duty to others and his opportunity to fulfill that duty
coincide; all facets of policy justify treating him harshly if he fails in
his duty of yielding right of way. Injustice occurs only when he is
given a duty which he cannot physically meet.
The favored driver, however, now enjoys a status that cannot be
as well defended. If the policy for expediting traffic is to be applied
to him, then any special privileges which he has should depend on facts
which are readily apparent to him. Except for green lights and private
entrances, no such test exists. It seems desirable that one should be
devised. An obvious and reasonable test would be to consider the
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physical nature of the highway on which he drives or the presence of
highway markings which designate a major road. If a driver is on
a dual highway, or on "U.S. Route No. 40," for example, he should
be entitled to assume that its entrances are appropriately signed and
that he is entitled to right of way. On lesser roads, he should have no
comparable right of assumption and should be required to exercise a
different standard of care at intersections.
Such a distinction would provide a means of effectuating the legis-
lative purpose of traffic expedition so often recited, since it would
affirmatively assist genuine arterial traffic, which presently is running
in blind reliance. At the same time, it will not affect public interest
in careful operation of vehicles, so long as the protection of the assump-
tion is not extended to unlawful or careless conduct. The distinction
suggested seems necessary if traffic movement is really to be expedited.
As urged previously, such a distinction can be found in a close reading
of the statutes.66 The absence of such a distinction, however, may be
so established that a legislative act is necessary to bring it into existence.
But, as has been stated before, the court must remove some blinders
in getting at causes in boulevard cases. Speed, time and distance are
material and relevant factors in determining fault in boulevard situa-
tions; in some cases, they are essential to entitle a claimant to recovery
or to protect a defendant from loss where there has been no fault of his.
Incompetent estimates are worthless, of course, and boulevard cases
cannot degenerate into a contest of engineering experts. However, strict
rules of admissibility are applied elsewhere, without difficulty, and the
scintilla of evidence rule need not be sacrosanct. Both juries and, especi-
ally, the courts need every aid in deciding cases where damages so
frequently are serious, and fault so frequently difficult to assess.
66. See the discussion at note 24, supra.
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